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THE NON-DEMOCRATIC ROOTS OF ELITE CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM
SOEHARTO MAYORS IN INDONESIA
MONICA MARTINEZ-BRAVO
CEMFI
PRIYA MUKHERJEE
Department of Economics, College of William & Mary
ANDREAS STEGMANN
CEMFI
Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups
retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted
in a country’s history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is lim-
ited. In this paper, we show that allowing old-regime agents to remain in office during
democratic transitions is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit
quasi-random from Indonesia: Soeharto-regime mayors were allowed to finish their
terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors’ political cycles were not
synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old-regime mayors
remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer ex-
posure to old-regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite per-
sistence, and lower political competition in the medium run. The results suggest that
slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to capture democracy.
KEYWORDS: Elite capture, democratic transitions, de facto power, Indonesia, public
good provision.
1. INTRODUCTION
SINCE THE EARLY 1990S, most countries in the world have had political systems that are
defined as democratic. However, democracies widely differ in the quality of their politi-
cal institutions. Oftentimes elites and powerful interest groups retain a disproportionate
amount of influence over the policy making process. While most scholars argue that elite
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capture is detrimental for political accountability and long-run development, we have a
limited understanding of the factors that facilitate the emergence and persistence of elites.
A large literature in political science1 and a rapidly growing literature in theoretical
economics2 argue that elite capture in democracies has its roots in the recent authoritar-
ian past of countries. Institutions developed during the non-democratic period can persist
and facilitate the continued influence of old-regime elites in the subsequent regime. For
instance, a new democracy can inherit the constitution, a large army, or an inefficient bu-
reaucracy from the previous regime. However, the empirical evidence on the presence of
these non-democratic legacies and on their effects on elite capture is scarce. Furthermore,
we have a limited understanding of how the persistence of old-regime elites depends on
the way the democratic transition unfolds.
In this paper, we exploit a quasi-random variation that originated during the Indone-
sian transition to democracy and that affected the degree to which old-regime elites could
capture local power. In 1998, the regime of General Soeharto unexpectedly came to an
end. However, the Soeharto-appointed district mayors were not immediately replaced
by democratically elected leaders. Instead, they were allowed to finish their five-year
terms before new elections were called for. Since the timing of appointments of Soe-
harto mayors was different across districts, this event generated exogenous variation in
the length of time during which these mayors remained in office during the democratic
transition.
Democratic transitions represent a critical juncture, along the lines described by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). During this period, new parties are created, new al-
liances are formed, and new institutions are developed. Small differences in pre-existing
conditions during critical junctures can lead to a process of institutional drift that gen-
erates important differences in long-run development. In this paper, we argue that small
differences in the number of years that Soeharto mayors served during the democratic
transition had substantial effects on the extent of elite capture in the subsequent demo-
cratic period.
We first document that the appointment timing of the last wave of mayors appointed by
the Soeharto regime—henceforth, Soeharto mayors—is orthogonal to predetermined dis-
trict characteristics, such as the level of public good provision, socioeconomic conditions,
and electoral support for Soeharto’s party. We also document that Soeharto mayors that
were appointed in the last years of the regime have similar observable characteristics. This
evidence supports our main empirical specification, where we regress a number of mea-
sures of quality of governance, which are measured about a decade after the transition,
on the year of appointment of the last Soeharto mayor. The later the appointment date,
the higher the number of years that Soeharto mayors were in office during the democratic
transition.
Our first set of results examines the effects on quality of local governance. We document
that districts with longer exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition exhibit lower
levels of public good provision, in particular in health and education. We also find that
those districts have weaker rule of law and greater prevalence of rent-seeking: private
sector firms are more likely to report that they face regular extortion from the military
and police groups. These results are present at the time when the term of all Soeharto
mayors had already expired. Hence, the effects we estimate cannot be accounted for by
the direct presence of the Soeharto mayors in office.
1See, for instance, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Linz and Stepan (1996).
2See, for instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010, 2011).
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These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of Soeharto may-
ors in office during the democratic transition facilitated elite capture and, hence, led to
worse governance outcomes in the medium run. In Appendix A of the Supplemental Ma-
terial (Martinez-Bravo, Mukherjee, and Stegmann (2017)), we present a formal model
that characterizes this mechanism. Our framework is based on the model developed by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), where elites can invest in de facto power to compensate
for the increase in the amount of de jure power that citizens obtain with democratiza-
tion. The results indicate that districts where the elite mayor has more periods to invest
in de facto power end up investing more in equilibrium. As a result, those districts exhibit
greater persistence of old-regime elites in power and lower levels of political competition.
Our proposed mechanism is also consistent with a vast qualitative literature which doc-
uments that Soeharto-era elites used a variety of strategies to perpetuate their hold on
power during the early stages of the democratic transition (Robinson and Hadiz (2004),
Honna (2010)).
Our second set of results presents evidence more closely connected with the mechanism
that, we argue, is behind these results. First, we examine the extent of elite persistence.
We find that, about a decade after the transition, districts with the longest exposure have
a 30% higher probability of having mayors closely connected to the Soeharto regime—
that is, mayors that were members of the military, bureaucrats, or politicians, during the
Soeharto regime. Second, we demonstrate that those districts exhibit greater electoral
support for Golkar, Soeharto’s party. These results are notable since we also show that
there were no pre-existing differences in support for Golkar during the Soeharto regime.
Third, we document that those districts exhibit lower levels of political competition during
subsequent mayoral elections. Fourth, we present suggestive evidence that exposure to
Soeharto mayors during the democratic transition weakened political accountability: in
those districts that experienced the longest exposure to Soeharto mayors, the likelihood
of reelection of subsequent mayors does not decrease with poor performance in public
good provision. This can, in turn, explain the low levels of public good provision, since
subsequent mayors may have had weaker incentives for performance.
This paper relates to the literature that has studied the historical roots of development
and quality of governance. The previous literature has stressed how colonization, slavery,
or other historical events affected the quality of institutions and economic performance.3
We contribute to this literature by examining the roots of elite capture in countries’ more
recent authoritarian past and by documenting that events that take place during demo-
cratic transitions can substantially affect the persistence of elites and institutions across
regimes.
This paper is also related to the political science and economics literature on de-
mocratization and on the determinants of democratic consolidation. Some examples
are O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Linz and Stepan (1996), Acemoglu and Robinson
(2008), Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010, 2011). This literature has argued that non-
democratic elites use a variety of methods to retain their influence in politics after democ-
ratization. We contribute to this literature by providing empirical evidence that events that
3See Nunn (2009) for a literature review.
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facilitate investments in de facto power during the transition can facilitate elite capture in
the subsequent regime.45
The paper also relates to the literature on elite capture in democratic politics by means
of vote buying, lobbying by interest groups, use of patronage networks, use of force or
the threat thereof. This literature has had a number of important theoretical and empir-
ical contributions. Some examples are Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), Fisman (2001),
Dal Bó and Di Tella (2003), Robinson and Torvik (2005), Finan and Schechter (2012),
Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, Purnamasari, and Wai-Poi (2013). Our paper has also
close connections with the literature that has studied the determinants of political dy-
nasties and how institutional reforms affect the continuity in power of these elites (Dal
Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009), Querubin (2011)). We add to this literature by studying
how the way in which the democratic transition unfolds could affect the extent of elite
persistence during the democratic period.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional back-
ground; Section 3 provides a conceptual framework to guide our interpretation of the
empirical results; Section 4 presents the data and empirical strategy; Section 5 presents
the main results of the paper; Section 6 describes a number of robustness checks; and
finally, Section 7 provides the conclusions.
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND6
2.1. National-Level Political Context
Soeharto’s autocratic rule lasted for more than three decades, from 1965 to 1998. Dur-
ing his regime, both the population and opposition parties were under tight control of
the government and the military. In May 1998, Soeharto lost crucial support and was
forced to step down. The numerous corruption cases that involved Soeharto’s family and
the economic consequences of the East Asian financial crises led to mass protests against
the regime. However, the fall of the regime was quite unexpected. By the year 1997, few
predicted the demise of the Soeharto government.
After the fall of Soeharto, a one-year transitional government took office and imple-
mented a number of democratic deepening reforms. The first democratic election after
the fall of Soeharto took place in June 1999. National, provincial, and district legisla-
tures were selected during this election. PDI-P, the main opposition party, obtained the
4To the best of our knowledge, there are only two other papers that have empirically documented the im-
pact of nondemocratic legacies on governance outcomes. Albertus and Menaldo (2014) showed that income
redistribution is lower in democracies that are preceded by democratic transitions where nondemocratic elites
remained powerful—for example, in transitions where the new democracy adopted the constitution of the
previous regime. Martinez-Bravo (2014) showed that the village-level appointees that a new democracy inher-
its from the previous regime have strong incentives to engage in electoral malpractice for strategic reasons.
Hence, they represent a legacy from the nondemocratic regime that, under certain conditions, can prevent
democratic consolidation.
5Our paper also contributes to the debate in political science about the optimal speed of democratic transi-
tions. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argued that democratic consolidation is more likely when the transition
is initiated by pacts among elites and, hence, the transition is characterized by gradual changes. In contrast,
Di Palma (1990) advocated for settling the main procedural rules at the beginning of the transition and, hence,
advocated for faster transitions. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that, at least at the
local level, slower or gradual transitions can facilitate elite capture by allowing nondemocratic elites to find
ways to capture local institutions.
6In this section, we provide the main aspects of the background institutional context. For a more detailed
discussion, see Section 1 of Appendix B.
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largest vote share with 34% of the votes. Golkar (Soeharto’s party) obtained 22% of the
votes. After a process of coalition formation at the national level, a moderate candidate
and the leader of PKB, Abdurramah Wahid, was elected president. Since then, legislative
elections have taken place every five years.
2.2. The Importance of District Mayors in Indonesia
Indonesia is divided into districts also known as kabupaten or kota. Each district has,
on average, 500,000 inhabitants. The district mayor position has existed since the Dutch
colonial period and has typically been associated with a considerable amount of authority.
District mayors have traditionally had substantial powers over local policies, regulations,
and over the district budget. Since democratization, district governments are also respon-
sible for the provision of important public goods, such as health and education (Hofman
and Kaiser (2006)). After democratization, districts’ main source of revenue became non-
earmarked transfers from the central government. District governments have discretion
about how to allocate these funds. The largest transfer is allocated based on a formula
that takes into account population, area, and poverty rate, among other factors.
During the Soeharto regime and the transitional government, district mayors were ap-
pointed by the central government. After democratization, the system was reformed and
mayors became indirectly elected by the district legislature. The local legislatures result-
ing from the 1999 election were entitled to elect the mayor according to the rules of
proportional representation once the term of the last Soeharto-appointed mayor expired.
As described above, the fact that these mayors were not immediately replaced after the
1999 election, and the fact that mayors’ terms were not synchronized, generated varia-
tion across districts in the length of time for which the Soeharto-appointed mayors were
in power during the democratic transition.7 The system of selection of district mayors
was further reformed in 2005 with the introduction of direct elections. The objective of
this reform was to further increase the level of accountability of mayors towards citizens
(Mietzner (2010)). Despite these reforms, the term length and term limit of the mayoral
position have not changed: district mayors can serve at most two terms of five years each.
2.3. Local Elite Capture
The Soeharto regime was characterized by a dramatic expansion of state capacity and
by the development of a vast patronage network that extended from the capital city of
Jakarta down to the village level. Through the allocation of public contracts, concessions,
credit, and extra-budgetary revenues, a network of individuals closely connected to the
state administration was able to amass large amounts of wealth. This class of individuals
typically consisted of members of the bureaucracy and the military. Moreover, they were
also members of Golkar, Soeharto’s party.8 Soeharto-appointed district mayors were cen-
tral agents of the patronage structure at the district level (Hadiz (2010)). Individuals in
7There is little documentation of the reasons why Soeharto mayors were allowed to finish their term. This
decision was taken by the transitional government, which was closely connected to Soeharto. The subsequent
democratically elected government may have lacked sufficient political capital to overturn this policy decision.
See Section 1.5 in Appendix B for further discussion.
8A distinct characteristic of the Soeharto regime is the fact that membership to the elite was defined by
their proximity to the state and the bureaucracy. According to Robinson and Hadiz (2004), this is a result
of the characteristics of post-colonial Indonesia. The Dutch colonialism did not leave large landowning elites
or a powerful urban bourgeoisie. In contrast, their main legacy was the establishment of a well-structured
bureaucracy. See Section 1.1 in Appendix B for more details.
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the network of the district mayor greatly benefited from the rent-seeking opportunities
that the proximity to the district government granted. Over time, this group of individuals
evolved into a local self-serving elite, whose main objective was to protect the extractive
institutions that enabled them to extract large rents from the system.
The fall of the Soeharto regime represented a dramatic change in the dynamics of po-
litical power at the local level. The elites nurtured during the Soeharto regime could no
longer remain in power by being loyal to the central government. Democratization led to
a change in de jure local institutions: as the term of the Soeharto mayor expired, may-
ors were elected by the local legislature constituted in the 1999 election. Consequently,
obtaining electoral support at times of elections became substantially more important.
Local elites developed a number of elite capture strategies to remain influential. Elites
developed close alliances with the military, police, and criminal organizations, known as
preman in Indonesia. These organizations were instrumental in obtaining support from
voters and members of the district legislature. These organizations used different com-
binations of money politics and intimidation strategies, including threats and violence
(Hadiz (2010)).
The building of alliances with the military was one of the main strategies of elite cap-
ture during this period. During the Soeharto regime and the transition, members of the
military were permanently deployed at each level of the administration, from provinces
to villages. With an authoritarian central government no longer in power, local military
units were free to redefine their alliances. This situation induced the local elites nurtured
under the Soeharto regime and locally-deployed members of the military to establish a
mutually beneficial arrangement: the military provided support to these elites at times of
elections in exchange for the implicit consent to carry out their illegal activities and extor-
tion of private sector firms (Honna (2010)). This quid-pro-quo relationship between elites
and the military was sustained through an implicit agreement of mutual trust and coop-
eration. Old-regime elites also resorted to other venues to retain their hold on power,
including buying out local media and hiring a network of supporters in the government
administration (Hadiz (2010)).
In most of the cases, those individuals holding power had a comparative advantage
in the development of these capture strategies: the district mayor and high-level local
bureaucrats had access to important resources that they could assign discretionarily. They
could also hire or promote individuals who were loyal to them (Hadiz (2010), Martinez-
Bravo (2014)).
Throughout the democratic transition, Golkar continued to be the main political ve-
hicle of the Soeharto-era elites. While there were changes in the national leadership,
Golkar continued to represent the autocratic status quo and to host a large fraction of
former members of the military and the bureaucracy in their ranks (Hadiz (2010)).
These strategies of elite capture have resulted in a substantial amount of persistence
of the Soeharto elites in local politics. Several scholars have discussed this phenomenon
and have provided evidence that a large fraction of district mayors elected in the post-
Soeharto period had close connections with the Soeharto regime (Mietzner (2010)).
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In Section S1 of Appendix A, we present a theoretical model to guide the interpretation
of our results. The model is an adaptation and simplification of the framework developed
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008). Next, we summarize the main insights.
There are two groups in society: a small elite and citizens. They contest power in each
district. The game starts as a non-democratic regime and the elites are in power in all
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districts. For exogenous reasons, the country initiates a democratic transition and local
elections are scheduled in all districts. Citizens can contest power and, since citizens are
the most populous group, they have a natural electoral advantage. In order to prevent
citizens from taking power, the elites can invest de facto power. We assume that there
are two types of districts. In the first set of districts, local elections are scheduled after
one period, and that is the amount of time the elites have to invest in de facto power. In
contrast, in the second type of districts, the elites have more time to invest in de facto
power as local elections are scheduled to take place in two periods. We refer to these
as one-period and two-period districts, respectively. The costs of investments in de facto
power are increasing and convex in each period. After investments are made, elections
are held, payoffs are distributed, and the game ends.
The main results of this model correspond to the equilibrium levels of investments in
de facto power in each type of districts. First, we show that the per-period investment is
larger in one-period districts than in two-period districts. One-period elites try to compen-
sate their shorter window to invest in de facto power by increasing the intensity of their
investments. However, the overall investment (across periods) is higher in two-period dis-
tricts. In other words, districts that are given more time to invest in de facto power end up
investing more.
Mapping to the Indonesian Context and Empirical Implications. The above conceptual
framework was designed to match specific features of the Indonesian democratic tran-
sition. For instance, the staggered replacement of Soeharto mayors generated variation
in the amount of time that those mayors had available before they faced elections. The
qualitative literature suggests that Soeharto mayors used this time to develop different
strategies of elite capture. These strategies can also be understood as investments in de
facto power. For instance, Soeharto elites could make a deal with the local military to ob-
tain their support in exchange for budgetary allocations or implicit permission to engage
in rent-seeking activities. Similarly, the Soeharto mayors and their cronies could hire a
network of political brokers that would buy votes at time of elections or would intimidate
opponents. These tasks were typically conducted by criminal organizations—preman—or
by loyal individuals hired in the government administration.
The model assumes that these investments in de facto power are costly and that the cost
function is increasing and convex. As a result, the elite prefers to spread the investment
over multiple periods. This assumption captures the idea that elites only have limited time
and resources to simultaneously realize multiple investments in de facto power of differ-
ent nature. One way of capturing this in the model is to assume that the marginal cost of
investments in de facto power is increasing in the number of elite capture activities that
elites undertake. Furthermore, it is likely that time gives other advantages in the produc-
tion of de facto power. For instance, the construction of a network of political brokers
may need time to identify suitable candidates. Time can also facilitate the development
of stronger alliances with the military or with political brokers.9
The model assumes that elites only invest in de facto power after democratization. This
matches the Indonesian context: during the Soeharto regime, local elites could persist in
power by being loyal to Soeharto. Only when losing power at the local level became a
9Note that the latter two possibilities are not explicitly captured by the model. Our model is highly stylized
and imposes minimal assumptions on the production function of de facto power. In particular, we assume
that the resulting level of de facto power is only a function of the total investment across periods. Hence, the
production function of de facto power does not take into account the time dimension.
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possible outcome did elites have incentives to undertake costly investments in the devel-
opment of elite capture strategies. Furthermore, democratization also changed the op-
timal electoral malpractice strategies. During the Soeharto regime, there was no risk of
Golkar losing the election. Hence, massive implementations of vote buying schemes were
not necessary. With democratization, vote buying had become a more extended practice
(Antlöv (2004)).
To sum up, the conceptual framework presented in this section predicts that old-regime
elites that have more time to invest in de facto power end up investing more. This has a
number of empirical implications. First, we expect to find higher levels of elite persistence
in districts where the Soeharto mayor was in power for longer during the democratic
transition. Second, we expect to find lower levels of political competition. Effective elite
capture strategies diminish real power contestation and decrease the possibility of losing
power. Third, low levels of political competition weaken the incentives of subsequent
mayors to exert effort and deliver public goods. Hence, we expect to find lower levels of
public good provision and higher levels of rent-seeking.10
4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Data. Our main measure of exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition is ob-
tained from documenting the political histories of district mayors in Indonesia. We use
data collected by a team of researchers at the World Bank (Skoufias, Narayan, Dasgupta,
and Kaiser (2014)). Since this information was missing for 44% of the Soeharto mayors,
we complement the data set using information available from the Government of In-
donesia’s Official Directories. Overall, these two data sources provide us with the names,
appointment dates, and end dates of the district mayors that were in office between 1988
and 2004. We complement these data with information on the background occupations
of mayors, which we collected through online searches on Indonesian news portals and
personal websites of mayors.
Our outcome data come from different sources. We describe them as they become
relevant throughout the text. See Section 2 of Appendix B for an exhaustive list of all data
sets used in this paper and for details on the construction of the main data set.
Our estimating sample corresponds to districts that have complete information on out-
comes and covariates and did not split during the sample period.11 Furthermore, in our
baseline sample, we drop districts where the last Soeharto mayor was appointed in the
year 1998. Since Soeharto stepped down on May 1998, most of the 1998 appointments
were made by the transitional government. Hence, these appointments are likely to be
different in nature, which hinders the interpretation of these results.12 The resulting sam-
ple consist of 129 districts.
Empirical Strategy. Figure 1 shows the timing of events, which helps to illustrate the
empirical strategy. Until the end of 1998, district mayors were appointed by the Soeharto
regime or the transitional government. The possible appointment dates of the last group
of Soeharto mayors ranged from 1994 to 1998. These mayors were allowed to finish their
five-year term before being replaced by mayors indirectly elected by the local legislatures,
10This is consistent with a recent empirical literature that documents that low levels of political competition
are associated with low public good provision and with negative economic outcomes. See Besley, Persson, and
Sturm (2010) and Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014).
11District division can generate particular political dynamics that can confound the mechanisms described
in this paper. See Sections 2.2 and 3.6 in Appendix B for further details and robustness checks.
12See Section 3.5 in Appendix B for the results including districts with appointments in 1998.
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FIGURE 1.—Timeline of events and outcome measurement.
which were constituted in 1999. Hence, in some districts, Soeharto mayors were in office
until 2003, represented in the figure by the shaded interval period.
Figure 1 also shows that all our outcomes are measured after 2003, once Soeharto may-
ors were no longer in office. Hence, the effects we estimate cannot be accounted for by
the direct presence of the Soeharto mayors in office.13
Our main empirical specification is the following:
yjdh = α0 + α1YearAppd + δh +X ′dγ +Z′jλ+ εjdh (1)
where yjdh is the outcome of interest for subject j, located in district d in island group h.
YearAppd is the year of appointment of the last Soeharto mayor in district d. δh are island
group fixed effects.14 X ′d are district-level controls, in particular, the vote shares of Golkar
and PDI in the 1992 election of the Soeharto regime. Z′j include subject-level controls.
15
The higher the value of the YearAppd , the longer the time that the last Soeharto mayor
remains in power during the democratic transition. Hence, we expect to find α1 < 0 when
the dependent variable is a measure of quality of governance or public good provision.
In a second specification, we relax the linearity assumption of the treatment effect by
replacing YearAppd with dummies for the different years. The omitted category corre-
sponds to districts with appointments in 1994. Similarly, we expect the coefficients on
these dummies to be negative and increasing in absolute magnitude in the appointment
year.
Note that our regressors of interest correspond to the appointment timing rather than
to the timing of the end of the Soeharto mayor’s term. We use appointment timing be-
cause it precedes the fall of Soeharto and, hence, it is more likely to be exogenous to
political factors determined during the democratic transition. The estimates should be in-
terpreted as capturing the Intention To Treat effects. However, the appointment and end-
ing timings are strongly correlated. See Table S1 in Appendix A for the cross-tabulation
of appointment and ending timings.
The main identifying assumption is that the timing of appointment of the last Soeharto
mayors is as good as randomly assigned, conditional on controls—that is, exogenous to
13Soeharto mayors were allowed to run for office during the democratic period, but the reelection rates
were low. About 12% of them were reelected.
14The main island groups are Java and Bali, Kalimantan, Maluku, NT, Papua, Sulawesi, and Sumatra.
15When the outcome is measured at the village level, we control for village size. When the outcome is
measured at the firm level, we control for size and age of the firm. See table notes for details.
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underlying factors that could have affected the quality of local governance or public good
provision during the democratic transition. We find that this assumption is plausible for
several reasons. First, appointment timing precedes the fall of the Soeharto regime and
was predetermined. Appointments have been regularly scheduled for the years when the
term of the previous mayor expired since the latter part of the Dutch colonial period. Any
accumulation of early terminations, for health or other reasons, could have generated a
staggered pattern of appointment timings in the long run. Second, the fall of the Soeharto
regime was unexpected and unrelated to the political dynamics of specific districts. It is the
combination of these two features that makes the appointment timing of the last Soeharto
mayors likely to be uncorrelated to potential outcomes of districts during the transition.
In Section 3 of Appendix B, we provide empirical evidence supporting the exogeneity
of the appointment timing. We show that the appointment timing is uncorrelated with
a large number of predetermined district characteristics. Furthermore, we show that the
last cohorts of Soeharto mayors are similar in observable characteristics, such as level
of education, background occupation, age, and region of birth. This suggests that the
appointment pattern did not change in the years leading to the end of the Soeharto regime
and it is consistent with the unexpected nature of the fall of the regime.
5. RESULTS
Effects of Exposure to Soeharto Mayors on Quality of Governance. The first governance
outcome that we study corresponds to extortion of private sector firms. We obtain this
measure from the Economic Governance Survey, conducted in 2007 and 2011, to a large
number of firms. Firm managers were asked whether they had to regularly pay illegal
fees to different organizations to protect their own security. The prevalence of regular
extortion of firms indicates that property rights were vulnerable and that rule of law was
not strictly enforced.
Table I presents the results for illegal fees paid to the military and police. Column 1
shows that each additional year that a Soeharto mayor was in office during the transition
increases the likelihood of illegal payments to the military or the police by 2.4 percentage
points. This represents a 17% increase over the sample mean, which is a sizable increase.
Column 2 relaxes the linearity assumption of the treatment effects by including dummies
for the different appointment years. The magnitude of the coefficients is increasing in
the year of appointment and it is the highest for districts with appointments in 1997. The
results suggest that, in districts with the longest exposure to Soeharto mayors, firms have a
7.6 percentage points higher probability of having to pay illegal fees to the security forces,
which represents a 54% increase over the sample mean.16
These results suggest that districts where the Soeharto mayors were in office for longer
during the transition had weaker protection of property rights. Given the large literature
that documents the importance of property rights for economic performance,17 it is likely
that these rates of extortion were detrimental for business activity.
Furthermore, these results are also consistent with the Indonesian qualitative litera-
ture that suggests that security forces were instrumental in the elite capture strategies of
16 In Section S2.1 of Appendix A, we show additional results for illegal fees paid to local officials and crim-
inal organizations. These other forms of rent extraction are less prevalent. Consequently, the effects are less
precise. However, the results are similar in magnitude. We also show that the results are robust to restricting
the sample to those firms that are the least likely to be connected to the Soeharto elites; in particular, to small
firms whose owners do not know the mayor in person.
17See, for instance, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Besley (1995).
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TABLE I
EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO SOEHARTO MAYORS ON QUALITY OF GOVERNANCEa
Dependent Variables
Illegal Payments to Z-Score Education Z-Score Health
Military or Police Public Goods per Capita Public Goods per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.14 0.14 0 0 0 0
Year of Appointment 0024∗∗∗ −0047∗∗∗ −0061∗∗
(0.009) (0.017) (0.024)
Appointment 1995 0042∗∗∗ −0060 −0021
(0.015) (0.062) (0.063)
Appointment 1996 0049∗∗ −0115∗∗ −0185∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.057) (0.069)
Appointment 1997 0076∗∗∗ −0128∗∗ −0068
(0.029) (0.055) (0.078)
Observations 8,147 8,147 13,014 13,014 12,665 12,665
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.117 0.117 0.119 0.126
Number of Clusters 127 127 108 108 108 108
aStandard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. In columns 1 and 2 the unit of observation is the firm. The dependent
variable takes value 1 if firms report having to pay illegal fees to the military or police to protect their own security. In columns 3 to
6 the unit of observation is the village. The dependent variables corresponds to z-scores of public good provision in education and
health from the 2011 village census. All specifications include as controls island-group fixed effects and Golkar and PDI 1992 vote
shares. Columns 1 and 2 also include controls for the number of years of experience of the firm, number of employees, and a dummy
for the wave of the EGI survey. Columns 3 to 6 include controls for a quartic in log population. ∗∗∗p< 001, ∗∗p< 005, ∗p< 01.
old-regime elites. Soeharto-era elites established a quid-pro-quo relationship where the
military provided support to local elites at times of elections in exchange for the implicit
consent to carry out their illegal activities, including extortion of private sector firms.
While we do not have direct evidence that the firm extortion benefited the local elites
linked to the incumbent mayor, the evidence suggests that elite capture strategies were
more prevalent in districts that had longer exposure to Soeharto mayors during the tran-
sition.
Next, we examine the effects on public good provision. We obtain measures of the avail-
ability of public services from the village census. We present evidence on the availability
of health and education public goods. Columns 3 to 6 of Table I report the results for
the standardized averages, or z-scores, of different groups of public goods, measured in
the 2011 village census.18 The results suggest that every additional year of exposure to
Soeharto mayors reduces public goods in education by 0.047 standard deviation, and in
health public goods by 0.061 standard deviation. The point estimates on the different ap-
pointment years are increasing for education public goods and less precisely estimated for
health public goods.
An important advantage of the use of the village census is that measures of public good
provision are reported for several years. This allows the implementation of a panel-data
specification to control for district-level unobserved heterogeneity. We construct a village-
level panel for a number of years between 1986 and 2011. We exclude the years when
the Soeharto mayors were in office in order to compare the pre-appointment period to
18See Figure 2 for the list of outcomes included in each z-score. We focus on these outcomes because of
three reasons: they are central for the well-being of citizens; they are under the direct control of the district
mayors; and they are available in several waves of the village census.
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FIGURE 2.—Effects of exposure to Soeharto mayors on public good provision (panel specification). Notes:
Each public good outcome is expressed in per-capita terms and standardized. Point estimates and 90% confi-
dence intervals shown in the figure.
the period when public goods are potentially affected by the legacy of their elite capture
strategies.19 More specifically, we estimate the following econometric model:
yjdt = γ0 + γ1YearAppd × Post_2003t + δd + ρt + εjdt (2)
where yjdt is a public good outcome in village j of district d in year t, YearAppd is the year of
appointment of the last Soeharto mayor, Post_2003t takes value 1 for years 2003 and later,
δd are district fixed effects, ρt are year fixed effects. This specification is equivalent to a
Difference-in-Differences specification, where we compare public good provision before
and after Soeharto mayors were in office, and across districts that had different levels of
exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition.
Figure 2 presents the estimates of γ1 for the different measures of public goods and
the estimates for the standardized z-scores to assess the joint significance of the effects.
The z-scores for education and health show negative effects of 0.03 standard deviation
that are statistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the point estimates for all
outcomes are consistently negative. Overall, these results show that districts with longer
exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition experienced a deterioration in public
good provision relative to districts with shorter exposure. Furthermore, the results on the
cross-sectional and panel specifications are similar, consistent with the assumption that
the appointment timing is orthogonal to unobservable district-level characteristics.
In Sections S2.1 and S2.2 of Appendix A, we provide a detailed discussion and present
additional measures of public goods. In particular, we show suggestive evidence that dis-
tricts with higher exposure to Soeharto mayors experienced higher child and maternal
mortality, and achieved, on average, lower test scores in national exams.
19In particular, we include the following years: 1986, 1990, 1993, 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2011.
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Evidence on the Mechanism: Elite Persistence and Political Competition. The results pre-
sented so far provide evidence that districts with later appointments of the last Soeharto
mayors exhibit worse governance outcomes in the medium run. In Section 3, we pre-
sented a particular mechanism, which provides a plausible explanation for these results
and which is in agreement with the qualitative literature on the Indonesian democratic
transition: those Soeharto mayors that were appointed later, served for more years dur-
ing the transition and, hence, had more time to adjust to the new political scenario. As
a result, they were able to undertake greater investments in de facto power. These in-
vestments led to more elite capture and lower political competition. Subsequent mayors
in districts with higher elite capture had weaker incentives for performance. This can ex-
plain the evidence on lower provision of public goods and the higher rates of rent-seeking.
Next, we present additional empirical evidence more closely connected to our proposed
mechanism.
First, we examine the effects on elite persistence. For this purpose, we collected a novel
data set on the professional background histories of the mayors elected in the first direct
elections that were introduced starting in 2005.20 Following the work of Indonesian schol-
ars, we define membership to the old-regime elite by previous occupation.21 We define
mayors as connected to the Soeharto elites if they were members of the military, bu-
reaucrats, or politicians, during the Soeharto regime, that is, before 1998. To increase the
representativeness of this exercise, we collect information on the mayor and vice-mayor.22
Column 1 in Table II presents the results. The dependent variable takes value 1 if ei-
ther the mayor or the vice-mayor were connected to the Soeharto regime, and 0 otherwise.
The mean of this variable is 0.71, suggesting that a large fraction of districts in Indone-
sia elected mayors linked to the old regime. Panel A reports the results of our baseline,
linear specification. The results indicate that every extra year that a Soeharto mayor is
in power during the democratic transition increases the likelihood of elite persistence by
11 percentage points, which represents a 16% increase over the sample mean. Panel B
reports the flexible specification using dummies for the different appointment years. The
point estimates exhibit an increasing pattern, with the strongest effects corresponding to
years of appointment 1996 and 1997. Hence, consistent with the mechanism suggested in
Section 3, there is a higher prevalence of elite persistence in districts where the Soeharto
mayors were in office for longer during the early stages of the democratic transition.
Second, we examine the effects on the presence and support for Golkar. Golkar was
Soeharto’s party and, after democratization, Golkar continued to be the preferred polit-
ical vehicle of the old-regime elites. In column 2 of Table II, we examine the effect on
the likelihood that the directly elected mayors were supported by Golkar.23 The results
indicate that every additional year of exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition
increases the likelihood of having in office a mayor supported by Golkar by 13 percentage
20Direct elections for mayor were introduced in a staggered fashion mainly during the period 2005 to 2008
as the term of the previous mayor expired. In the empirical specification, we add controls for early elections.
See Section 1.5 in Appendix B for details.
21During the Soeharto regime, the bureaucracy and the military were the two groups most closely associated
with the Soeharto administration (Hadiz (2010)). See Section 2.3 in this paper and Section 1.1 in Appendix B
for further details.
22Both individuals contest elections running as a candidate pair. While the district mayor has most of the
decision power, the vice-mayor is also an important political figure in the districts. We were able to obtain
information on the background of the mayor or vice-mayor for 119 districts.
23Most candidates in the first direct mayoral elections were supported by a coalition of parties. The de-
pendent variable in column 2 takes value 1 if the elected mayor was supported by a coalition that included
Golkar.
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TABLE II
EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO SOEHARTO MAYORS ON ELITE CAPTUREa
Dependent Variables
Elite Persistence Support for Golkar in Parliamentary Elections
Elected Elected Golkar Most Golkar Golkar
Mayor Connected Mayor Supported Voted Party in District-Level District-Level
to Soeharto by Golkar Coalition the Village Vote Share Vote Share
(2005–2008) (2005–2008) (2004) (2004) (2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var. Mean 0.71 0.21 0.32 21.62 15.22
Panel A. Linear Treatment Effect
Year of Appointment 0109∗∗ 0131∗∗∗ 0072∗∗∗ 1595∗∗ 1381∗∗
(0.044) (0.048) (0.018) (0.665) (0.658)
Observations 119 122 21,826 129 129
R-squared 0.218 0.084 0.196 0.509 0.306
Number of Districts 119 122 129 129 129
Panel B. Flexible Treatment Effect
Appointment 1995 −0048 0.019 0072∗∗ −0396 0.002
(0.106) (0.095) (0.036) (1.702) (1.675)
Appointment 1996 0215∗ 0235∗ 0157∗∗∗ 2.421 1.580
(0.126) (0.131) (0.051) (1.863) (1.643)
Appointment 1997 0287∗∗ 0376∗∗ 0204∗∗∗ 4581∗∗ 4502∗∗
(0.139) (0.169) (0.057) (2.228) (2.214)
Observations 119 122 21,826 129 129
R-squared 0.242 0.098 0.197 0.516 0.313
Number of Districts 119 122 129 129 129
aColumns 1, 2, 4 and 5 show robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 3 shows standard errors clustered at the district level in
parentheses. In columns 1, 2, 4 and 5, the unit of observation is the district level, while in column 3 the unit of observation is the village
level. All specifications include as controls island-group fixed effects and Golkar and PDI 1992 vote shares. Columns 1 and 2 also add
an indicator for early direct elections. Column 3 also controls for a quartic in log population. ∗∗∗p< 001, ∗∗p< 005, ∗p< 01.
points. Panel B shows that the effects are increasing in magnitude, being the highest for
districts with the longest exposure to Soeharto mayors.
Columns 3 to 5 examine the effects of electoral support for Golkar in the 2004 and 2009
legislative elections, respectively.24 These measures have a number of advantages. Each
election took place on the same day in all districts. Hence, this mitigates concerns that
the results are driven by measuring outcomes in different points in time. The dependent
variable in column 3 is obtained from the village census, while the dependent variables
in columns 4 and 5 correspond to vote shares obtained from the Indonesian Electoral
Commission.
The results suggest that Golkar developed an electoral advantage in the districts that
had longer exposure to Soeharto mayors during the democratic transition. The evidence
is consistent across time—present both in 2004 and in 2009—and across different data
sources. These results are particularly notable given that, at baseline, there were no dif-
ferences in support for Golkar across districts. Furthermore, these results persist over a
24In these elections, the national, provincial, and district legislatures are elected. The outcome of columns
3 and 5 corresponds to the results for the national legislature. The outcome in column 4 corresponds to the
district legislature. However, since the elections for the three legislatures take place on the same date, there
are typically very few split votes, that is, voters vote for the same party regardless of the level of the legislature.
See Section 2 in Appendix B for further details.
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TABLE III
EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO SOEHARTO MAYORS ON POLITICAL COMPETITIONa
Dependent Variables
Number Share Incumbent
Number of of Independent of Independent Herfindahl Not Z-Score
Candidates Candidates Candidates Index Reelected col 1–5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Dep. Var. 3.85 0.13 0.02 0.62 0.40 0.00
Panel A. Linear Treatment Effect
Year of Appointment −0282∗ −0153∗∗ −0029∗∗∗ −0000 −0096∗ −0200∗∗
(0.143) (0.068) (0.011) (0.013) (0.053) (0.081)
Observations 129 129 129 126 129 126
R-squared 0.193 0.247 0.238 0.207 0.124 0.272
Panel B. Flexible Treatment Effect
Appointment 1995 −0166 −0188 −0033 −0011 −0035 −0210
(0.271) (0.129) (0.022) (0.028) (0.122) (0.157)
Appointment 1996 0.040 −0130 −0040∗ 0.034 −0129 −0142
(0.358) (0.151) (0.022) (0.035) (0.142) (0.183)
Appointment 1997 −1388∗∗∗ −0639∗∗∗ −0104∗∗∗ −0041 −0329∗ −0875∗∗∗
(0.528) (0.240) (0.039) (0.046) (0.181) (0.286)
Observations 129 129 129 126 129 126
R-squared 0.238 0.275 0.248 0.225 0.128 0.303
aRobust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of observation is the district level. All specifications include as controls island-
group fixed effects, Golkar and PDI 1992 vote shares, and an indicator for early direct elections. ∗∗∗p< 001, ∗∗p< 005, ∗p< 01.
decade after the onset of the transition. Given that Golkar continued to be the main politi-
cal vehicle of old-regime elites, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that districts
with longer exposure of Soeharto mayors developed a number of elite capture strategies
that allowed old-regime elites to have an electoral advantage at times of elections.
Third, we explore the effects on the level of political competition. The results are pre-
sented in Table III. We obtain different measures of electoral competition from the elec-
toral results of the first direct election of district mayors. Column 1 shows the results when
the dependent variable corresponds to the number of candidates contesting the elections.
Every additional year of exposure of Soeharto mayors decreases the number of candi-
dates by 0.28. Panel B shows that this effect is particularly strong for districts that had the
longest exposure to Soeharto mayors: districts where the Soeharto mayor was appointed
in 1997 have 1.4 fewer candidate contesting the elections. Columns 2 and 3 explore the
effects on number of independent candidates and share of independent candidates, re-
spectively. Independent candidates are not affiliated to a specific party, contest elections
with local platforms, and are perceived as being independent of party elites. The results
suggest that exposure to Soeharto mayors leads to fewer independent candidates con-
testing these elections. Panel B indicates that these effects are negative and increasing in
magnitude on the degree of exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition. Column
4 explores the effect on the Herfindahl Index of political competition.25 While the effects
25This index is defined as 1 minus the sum of squares of the vote shares of each candidate. If candidate
i obtains vote share si , the Herfindahl Index will be computed as 1 −∑i s2i . If only one candidate runs for
elections and obtains a 100% vote share, the index would take value 0. The index is increasing in the degree of
political competition among candidates.
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are small and statistically insignificant, the point estimate of the districts with the longest
exposure is negative.26
Column 5 explores the extent to which incumbent mayors lose reelection.27 We ob-
serve that districts with longer exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition exhibit
a greater incumbency advantage. This result is particularly notable given the evidence of
worse governance outcomes and the deterioration in public good provision that we docu-
ment for those districts. Finally, in column 6, we report the z-score for the different mea-
sures of political competition. Panel A suggests that every additional year of exposure to
Soeharto mayors decreases the index of political competition by 0.2 standard deviations.
In Section S2.3 of Appendix A, we further investigate the results on incumbency ad-
vantage. We regress an indicator for whether the incumbent mayor is reelected, on our
proxy of exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition, and its interaction with a
measure of poor performance in public good provision. We find that, in districts with no
exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition, poor performance is associated with
lower reelection probabilities. This result is expected in the presence of political account-
ability. However, the interaction term is positive, suggesting that exposure to Soeharto
mayors reduces the strength of this accountability relationship and allows some mayors
to be reelected despite their poor performance. The results are presented in Appendix-A
Table S5.
The coexistence of higher electoral support for old-regime mayors and poor perfor-
mance in terms of public good provision is consistent with the presence of elite capture.
Mayors linked to the old-regime elite could obtain electoral support through vote buying
and voter intimidation strategies. Furthermore, in the absence of voting based on perfor-
mance, incumbent mayors have weak incentives to exert effort to deliver public goods.
This, in turn, can explain the poor governance outcomes observed in the medium run.
The conceptual framework, presented in Section 3, provides a plausible explanation
for the presence of higher levels of elite capture in districts that had longer exposure to
Soeharto mayors: in those districts, Soeharto mayors had more time to adjust to the new
political scenario after the fall of Soeharto. They used this time to pursue strategies that
would promote the old-regime elites’ continued influence and access to power.
While there could be alternative explanations for each piece of evidence when con-
sidered in isolation, we believe that the presence of elite capture is the most convincing
explanation for the results as a whole.28 Furthermore, the fact that appointment timing
is consistently associated with outcomes that proxy for elite capture, and the fact that
there were no differences across these districts at baseline, is supportive of the hypothesis
that differences in the time horizon of Soeharto mayors during the transition generated
different levels of investment in elite capture that persisted over time.
26Note that we do not find evidence that exposure to Soeharto mayors affects how divided the opposition
was. We examine this empirically by constructing a Herfindahl Index of non-Golkar candidates. Hence, it is
unlikely that incumbent mayors promoted the entry of candidates as a strategy to divide the electoral support
of opposition parties. The results are available upon request.
27In particular, the dependent variable takes value 1 for districts where neither the newly elected mayor nor
the vice-mayor served as mayors or vice-mayors in the previous term.
28For instance, an alternative explanation for the higher persistence of old-regime mayors in districts with
later appointments could be that those Soeharto mayors had more time to get familiar with the new de jure
institutions and used this time to cultivate a good reputation. However, the evidence on worse public good
provision and the weakening of the accountability relationship seems hard to reconcile with efforts to build a
good reputation. A more plausible explanation for both sets of results is that Soeharto mayors had more time
to invest in elite capture strategies. This explanation is also consistent with the vast literature in Indonesian
politics. See Section 3 in Appendix B for further discussion and robustness checks.
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6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Section 3 of Appendix B provides several robustness checks and tests for alternative
explanations. In this section, we summarize the most important ones.
First, we present a detailed description of the unexpected nature of the fall of the Soe-
harto regime. This is important because if the end of the regime had been foreseen, the
central government may have changed the pattern of appointments of district mayors. We
provide empirical evidence that mayors appointed in the last years of the Soeharto regime
did not differ on observable characteristics. We also show that our results are robust to
dropping districts with appointments in 1997. Furthermore, we document that the fall of
the Soeharto regime was unrelated to district-level political dynamics.
Second, we provide evidence that our results cannot be explained by the timing of sub-
sequent reforms or by the characteristics of subsequent elections. Our results are robust
to controlling for economic and political conditions at the time of appointment and of
subsequent elections for mayors. Our results are also robust to controlling for the tim-
ing of the introduction of direct elections and for the years of experience of subsequent
mayors.
Third, we investigate the possibility that the transitional government might have pun-
ished districts that had longer exposure to Soeharto mayors during the transition because
they were politically opposed to them. This would be especially problematic for our re-
sults on public good provision, since we find lower provision of public goods in districts
with longer exposure to Soeharto mayors. We provide several pieces of evidence that are
at odds with this alternative explanation. Using data on district government revenues of
different years, we show that districts with longer exposure to Soeharto mayors did not
receive fewer transfers from the central government. This is the case even for Special
Earmarked Transfers, also known as DAK, which are allocated upon the discretion of the
central government. Figure 3 summarizes these results by plotting the coefficient on year
of appointment of the Soeharto mayor when the dependent variable is the amount of
DAK transfers per capita received by each district; that is, we plot the α1 coefficient and
the 90% confidence interval corresponding to econometric specification (1). There is no
evidence that the central government punished districts with longer exposure to Soeharto
mayors, even when considering fully discretionary transfers. The figure also indicates the
central government administrations in office in each year. The results are similar across
the different administrations.
In addition to this, we implement a robustness check where we explicitly control for
central government transfers in our main specification. All our results are fully robust to
these additional controls. We also examine whether the central government differentially
allocated federal programs across districts by exposure to Soeharto mayors. We show that
the main federal programs—provision of health cards, unconditional cash transfers, and
subsidized rice—were not differentially allocated across districts.
Fourth, we document that our results are similar when using as regressor the year of the
end of the term of the Soeharto mayor, instead of the year of appointment. In particular,
we implement an instrumental variable strategy where the appointment timing is used
as an instrument for the ending timing. The instrumental variable estimates are highly
significant and slightly larger in magnitude.
Finally, we conduct a range of additional robustness checks: we provide a number of
analyses that suggest that restricting the sample to districts that did not split does not lead
to biased estimates. We also show that our electoral results are not driven by measuring
outcomes with different lags since the Soeharto mayor stepped down.
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FIGURE 3.—Effects on Special Earmarked Grant (DAK). Notes: Point estimates and 90% confidence inter-
vals shown in the figure.
7. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we provide evidence that districts that had longer exposure to Soeharto
mayors during the democratic transition exhibit worse governance outcomes more than
a decade after their appointment. In particular, we find that those districts exhibit worse
public good provision and weaker protection of property rights.
We provide a conceptual framework that provides a plausible explanation for these
results: the Soeharto mayors that, for exogenous reasons, stayed for longer in office dur-
ing the democratic transition had more time to adjust to the new political scenario that
emerged after the fall of Soeharto. As a result, they invested more in de facto power,
which led to higher levels of elite capture in the medium run.
We provide additional evidence consistent with this mechanism. We show that there is a
greater persistence of Soeharto elites in power in those districts that had longer exposure
to Soeharto mayors during the transition. Those districts also exhibit greater support for
Soeharto’s party and lower levels of political competition. Furthermore, we provide sug-
gestive evidence that those districts have weaker political accountability: voters are less
likely to punish incumbent mayors electorally for poor performance. The higher preva-
lence of elite capture and weaker accountability can, in turn, explain the deficient levels
of public good provision.
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it exploits a particu-
lar feature of the Indonesian democratic transition that generated exogenous variation
in the ability of elites to engage in elite capture strategies across the different districts.
We provide several pieces of evidence that suggest that the prevalence of elite capture
one decade after the transition was higher in those districts where elites had more oppor-
tunities to invest in elite capture. Therefore, the paper provides empirical evidence that
the incentives and opportunities of elites to invest in de facto power are a fundamental
determinant of the persistence of elites across different political regimes.
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Second, this paper provides empirical evidence that the way in which a democratic
transition unfolds has important effects on the quality of local governance in the long
run. In particular, the presence of agents of the old regime during the democratic transi-
tion can facilitate elite capture and, hence, can have a negative impact on the quality of
local democracy. An important literature in political science has argued that slow transi-
tions towards democracy are more likely to be successful, that is, less likely to suffer from
authoritarian reversals. However, this paper presents evidence that slow democratic tran-
sitions can also have important costs, as old-regime elites find it easier to capture the new
democracy. Expediting the process of leader turnover at the local level by accountable
leaders, or imposing additional checks and balances at the local level, might be beneficial
measures for new democracies.
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